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THE ENVIRONMENTALIST AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE
JAMES
I.

B. MOORE*

INTRODUCTION

]VAN and the environment have always been exposed to a small amount
of radiation, originating in cosmic rays and from the nuclear
decay of very large atoms. Species alive today must have long since
become acclimatized to this radiation, or they would no longer be in
existence. The effects of this radiation, however, may well have caused
some, if not all, of the genetic changes involved in the evolutionary
history of the world. No one can really say.'
Albert Einstein uncovered the amazing secret of the power stored
in the atom when he developed his famous equation E = mc', showing
the equivalence of mass and energy.2 Scientists working with this lead in
the 1930's began the first theoretical work which proved him correct.
They split the atom in 1938.2 During World War II this work was
brought to the attention of President Roosevelt who commissioned the
Manhattan Project to develop the atomic bomb.4
The pure scientists exploring this new energy source little realized
the potential for damage, outside the field of wartime destruction, which
their work would engender. They saw the vast untapped energy of the
atom as a new source of power to replace the rapidly decreasing fossil
fuels.5 What attention they did pay to the problem of radioactive waste
was minimal. They considered that any radioactivity released to the
environment would be quickly dispersed to such an extent as to make its
effects negligible. 6
* BSChE, BChE (with distinction), Cornell University; MBA (with distinction),
Northwestern University; JD (with distinction), IIT-Chicago Kent College of Law. Mr.
Moore is a vice president and director of the Hood Sponge Rubber Company (Schlegel
Illinois Inc.) and an instructor at the Industrial Management Institute, Lake Forest College,
Lake Forest, Ill. He is a member of the Illinois Bar.
1 Gallant, Pollution from the Atom, Nature & Sci. 11 (Mar. 4, 1970).
2 Peterson, Environmental Contamination from Nuclear Reactors, Scientist & Citizen
10 (Nov., 1965).
3 Snow, Radioactive Waste from Reactors, the Problem that Won't Go Away, Scientist
& Citizen 2 (May, 1967).
4 L. Strauss, Men and Decisions ch. IX (1962).
5 Supra n.3.
6 Supra n.1.
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That their creative work was a success can hardly be doubted.
Today atomic energy and radioactive atoms are used: (1) to power
both American and Russian submarines, American aircraft carriers,
and an American civilian surface vessel;' (2) to release natural gas
from otherwise unusable shale formations;' (3) to run electrical
generating plants;9 (4) to carry out industrial and medical research;
(5) and to effect medical cures. It has been considered as a source
of energy for constructing a second Panama Canal, for purifying salt
water,10 and for propelling vehicles such as aircraft and even automobiles. 1
That the side effects of their work have become extremely hazardous, and might portend the end of all life as we know it, cannot be
doubted. Both somatic and genetic effects have been directly linked
to radiation exposure. 12 Thus, to attempt to control the safety of atomic
devices, in addition to developing and expanding their peaceful use, a
fantastically powerful administrative agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, was created.'"
This article will attempt to put the hazards created by the use
of atomic energy, primarily in the creation of electrical power, into
some perspective. In so doing, it will analyze the effects of radioactive
pollution, the production, disposal and storage of radioactive waste,
the Atomic Energy Commission itself, and attempts which have been
made by environmentalist groups to influence and control the AEC.
II.

RADIOACTIVE POLLUTION AND ITS EFFECTS

There is a vast difference in the action on living organisms between
natural and synthetic radiation. Natural radiation, from cosmic rays
and the few naturally remaining radioactive elements such as radium,
S.S. Savannah.
8 Project Rulison.
9 In 1970 there were 17 nuclear plants in nine states, with 37 others planned. By 1972
there were 23 plants operable, 54 under construction and 52 planned (reactors ordered), in
30 states and Puerto Rico. Sells, Appearance by Top AEC Official Asked, Kalamazoo (Mich.)
Gazette, Aug. 23, 1970; Bukro, Nuclear Power, The Critics See Disaster Ahead, Chicago
Tribune, Mar. 12, 1972, § 1A, at 1, Col. 1 & 2.
10 Supra n.2, at 8.
11 Teller, Energy from Oil and From the Nucleus, J. Petroleum Technology 506 (May,
1965).
12 Supra n.2, at 8.
Ia Cf. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, amended as The Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq.
7
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thorium, and uranium, primarily affects plants and animals from the
outside. Man-made radiation does its damage internally. 4
Radioactive isotopes, created in both controlled and explosive
atomic reactions, quite often enter the ecological food chain. They
become increasingly concentrated as they move up the chain into the
higher plants and animals, and ultimately into man. Once established
as part of the human body, they continue to decay by giving off radiations for periods of hours or years, depending on the half-life of the
specific isotope involved. Data concerning those isotopes most commonly encountered show that many will not decay completely for
hundreds or even thousands of years.' 5 And there is no known way to
speed up the decay process. Physical changes of temperature and
pressure, or chemical changes such as combining the radioactive atoms
into different molecular structures, have no effect.' 6
The emissions generated by radioactive decay are of three types:
alpha particles, beta particles and gamma rays. 7 The alpha particles
consist of relatively slow-moving clusters of protons and neutrons
which can be stopped by human skin or even thin sheets of paper. Accordingly, one can assume that man has built up a high degree of
immunity to such naturally occurring radiation. Beta particles are
fast-moving electrons which can pass through skin or even several
inches of wood. They are thus relatively dangerous, even in naturally
occurring radioactivity. Gamma rays are strong energy rays like X-rays
that can pass through several inches of steel or several feet of concrete.
They are highly dangerous.
While having some degree of natural protection against outside
sources of radiation, plant and animal bodies have no protection against
radioactive isotopes trapped inside. Though little is known positively
concerning the destruction caused by internal energy releases, it is
conjectured, and has been to some degree proven, that it can be both
somatic (life shortening and cancer producing) and genetic (causing
mutations) .18
14 Schrader, Atomic Double Talk, The Center Magazine 37 (Jan.-Feb., 1971).

15 Supra n.2, at 4.
16 Bryerton, Radiation, A New Environmental Hazard?, Eugene (Ore.) Register Guard,
Oct. 1, 1969, at 7A.
17 Supra n.1, at 11.
18 Supra n.2, at 8.
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Thus, in addition to the general fear of nuclear accidents producing
catastrophes such as Hiroshima and Nagasaki, scientists and environmentalists are worried about the effects of the following specific
radioisotopes released in the production of nuclear power:
1. Strontium-90, with a half-life of 27 years: This isotope was
first released into the atmosphere from atomic bombs. Today it is also
a by-product of the production of electricity by nuclear reactors. The
human body mistakes it for calcium, and it tends to build up in bone
structure, especially among the young.' 9
2. Zinc-65, with a half-life of 245 days: This is not a reaction
product from the splitting of the uranium atom, but is generated in the
reactor shell. It is generally released to rivers and lakes in effluent
cooling water in what were once considered negligible amounts. It is
picked up and concentrated in the food chain first by microorganisms
and algae, later by fish and shellfish which feed on them. It is also
absorbed by plants which have been irrigated with contaminated water.
Man and animals eat both the fish and the plants.20
3. Iodine-131, with a half-life of eight days: This radioisotope
is usually released to the atmosphere as a gas in what were once thought
to be minute quantities. While it is dissipated rapidly, it has been found
in human and animal thyroid glands."
4. Tritium, H-3, with a half-life of twelve years: This material
was formerly ignored as an environmental contaminant because of its
very low production. 2 Tritium, however, combines with oxygen to form
"heavy water" and is readily assimilated into the gastrointestinal tract.
While it apparently does not concentrate, as do the other isotopes, it
reaches an equilibrium point in man corresponding to about twelve
times the tritium content of his daily water intake2
Other isotopes which have been uncovered in living organisms in
measurable quantities include Cesium-137, found in caribou meat eaten
19 Id. at 5.
20 Id.

21 Lieberman, Testimony concerning Radioactive Waste Management and Related
Materials, Feb. 1, 1968, Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, Congress of the U.S., Selected
Materials on Environmental Effects of Producing Electric Power 345 (Aug. 1969).
22 Supra n.3, at 5.
23 Larson, Environmental Effects of Producing Electric Power, Hearings before the
Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 91st Cong., Sess., pt. 1, at 222 (Oct.-Nov., 1969).
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by Eskimos,24 and Phosphorus-32, found in fish in the Columbia
River, 5 in fish in White Oak Lake, Tennessee, and in migratory ducks
killed in Canada.26
Sheldon Novick, in The Careless Atom, compares the phenomenon
of radioactive concentration to that of DDT, saying:
[E]very time radioactive waste is dumped into a stream, buried,
dropped into the ocean, discharged into the air, or otherwise released
from human control, it passes into the complex world of living things.
It will pass from living thing to living thing, sometimes being concentrated, at other times being dispersed, with an efficiency and
ingenuity which man has not yet come to understand. At unpredictable
times and places, this radioactive waste will reappear in man's food,
air or water.
It will not go away, for decades or centuries, or even
27
millenia.
III.

THE PRODUCTION AND DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE

Radioactive waste buildup begins at the uranium mines, where
tailings from ore-crushing operations have been accumulating for some
25 years. The relatively unconcentrated natural radioactivity in this
material is spread by wind and rain, primarily into the Colorado River.
Some of the tailings were once used as mortar in the construction of
buildings, and some eighty structures in Grand Junction, Colorado, are
said to have high radiation levels. 8
As the uranium is processed into fissionable material for reactors
or atomic weapons, more waste is accumulated and released to the
environment. When a bomb is exploded, a reactor operated, or a spent
reactor core rejuvenated, even more waste is produced.
This radioactive waste has been classified into two types. The first
consists of material of low activity, or low concentration of radioactive
isotopes, which is released as liquid, solid, or gas in the course of
operating reactors and other nuclear facilities. The second, occurring in
much smaller volume, is the material of high-level radioactivity produced during the reprocessing of the spent fuel elements from nuclear
reactors and from the manufacture of atomic weapons. This latter type
24
25
26

Supra n.21, at 337.

27
28

S. Novick, The Careless Atom 103 (1969).
Supra n.1, at 13.

Id.
Supra n.16.
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must be stored almost perpetually to guard against leakage to the environment.2"
Low-level gaseous and liquid wastes are either diluted and released
to the atmosphere or to nearby lakes and rivers, or are concentrated and
shipped to AEC storage points. Low-level solid wastes, consisting primarily of contaminated tools, fittings, and clothing, are normally
encased in drums filled with concrete and buried on land or dumped
into the ocean.30
High-level wastes are not present at the reactor site, but are produced at reprocessing plants where reusable uranium, worth some $8
per pound, is recovered from the spent reactor fuel. 3 These wastes are
buried on land."2
While the AEC states that much of the waste consists of chemicals
which do not present a radioactive hazard because of the short halflives of the isotopes involved, the activity levels of the high-level liquid
waste "may be as great as several thousand curies per gallon, producing beat generation rates of tens of BTU per hour. Since typical exposure limits for whole body doses are of the order of microcuries,...
a single gallon of the waste would be sufficient to threaten the health of
33
several million people.
Disposal of radioactive waste thus presents a major problem about
which a furor has arisen. The AEC has two basic principles which it
applies to the problem: "concentrate and contain" and "dilute and
disperse." 3 4 Accordingly, some four million cubic feet of low-level
contaminated materials are buried in the Idaho desert.3 5 While this
appears to be a logical solution to the disposal of such material, it
should be noted that much of it is buried about 600 feet directly above
the Snake River Aquifer, a huge underground river watering the Pacific
Northwest.3 6
29 Ramey, Remarks at the Conference on Universities, National Laboratories and Man's
Environment at Chicago, Ill., July, 1969, Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, Congress of the
U.S., Selected Materials on Environmental Effects of Producing Electrical Power 481 (Aug.
1969).
30 Supra n.2, at 4.
31 Supra n.3, at 3.
32 Supra n.29.
33 Supra n.3, at 3.
34 Bryerton, Growing Radioactive Wastes Worry Critics, Eugene (Ore.)
Register
Guard, Oct. 2, 1969, at 7A.
35 Farney, Atom Age Trash, The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 25, 1971.
36 Id.
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The high-level liquid waste, totaling some 80 million gallons in
1971," is stored in huge concrete-and-steel tanks located at Hanford,
Washington, near the Columbia River; at Arco, Idaho; and at Savannah
River, South Carolina.8" This storage presents a problem because of the
continuous maintenance requirements of a type never contemplated
by industry. The material is constantly boiling and is so corrosive that
it must be transferred about every ten years in order to replace deteriorated tanks. If this is not done the radioactive liquid will escape
into the ground and the atmosphere. For the present this presents
merely a technological task of gigantic proportions. But what will it be
hundreds or even thousands of years from now when the material is still
in the process of decay?"9
The AEC tells us that this method of storage has proven to be a
safe and practical method of "interim" storage. But they admit that its
long range usefulness is limited. Thus they are supporting large scale
research to establish methods to allow solidification of these liquid
wastes for ultimate burial in worked-out salt mines in Kansas. They
point out that while the present liquid storage areas are safe from earthquakes, floods and other natural disasters, the salt formations are
impervious to water and are in an area of absolutely no earthquake
activity. Further, salt formations are naturally plastic and self-sealing
on fracture.4"
Environmentalists tend to agree only so far as to the fact that
something had better be done with the liquid wastes, and soon. Some
do, and some do not agree with the salt-mine proposal. Most, apparently, are completely upset with an even newer proposal of the
AEC, called Project Bedrock. This is a plan to pump high-level liquid
waste directly into a cavern below the Tuscaloosa Aquifer. While AEC
studies show no leakage to the Aquifer possible, and that such on-site
disposal of waste from atomic-bomb production would eliminate the
obviously dangerous practice of transporting the wastes to the present
storage areas, the Aquifer is a source of drinking and industrial water
for a large area of the South. The real question is, of course, whether
the AEC is correct in assuming that the chance of leakage to the Aquifer
37 Lapp, Nuclear Power Plants, How Safe Are They, The Chicago Tribune, Feb. 7,
1971, § 1A, at 3.
38 Supra n.1, at 13.
39 Supra n.3, at 4-5.
40 Supra n.21, at 342.
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is negligible, not only in the foreseeable future, but for eternity.41 One
critic has pointed out that "the 'unexpected' has turned up often enough
in AEC literature to be 'ultimately expected' and that 'negligible' is a
favorite word 'in the limited AEC vocabulary.' ,142
The latest proposal is to permanently remove the wastes from the
environment of man by shooting them into the sun. The AEC has asked
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to look into the
costs of such a program. It admits, however, that the whole scheme is
dependent on the development of the space shuttle, at least a decade
away.43

IV.

THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

The preamble to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 states:
Atomic energy is capable of application for peaceful as well as military
purposes. It is therefore declared to be the policy of the United States
that
(a) the development, use, and control of atomic energy shall be
directed so as to make the maximum contribution to the general welfare, subject at all times to the paramount objective of making the
maximum contribution to the common defense and security; and
(b) the development, use, and control of atomic energy shall be
directed so as to promote world peace, improve the general welfare,
increase the standard
of living, and strengthen free competition in
44
private enterprise.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 had created, and this Act continued in existence, a most unique administrative agency, the Atomic

Energy Commission. The Commission was entrusted with a triple role:
(1) managing the military use of atomic energy by the services; (2)
developing and expanding peaceful use of atomic energy by private
individuals and firms; and (3) assuring public health and safety
from the dangers of atomic radiation. 41 In its dual role relative to the
civil population, the Commission has faced a perhaps major conflict
of interests. While increasing the use of atomic energy on the one hand,
it must make its use safe on the other. But this latter task can really
Supra n.35.
Green, The Law of Reactor Safety, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 115, 116 (1958-1959).
43 Nuclear Energy-Its Peacetime Use, U.S. News & World Report 47 (Feb. 14, 1972).
44 42 USC § 2011.
45 Ramey, The Environmental Eflects of Producing Electric Power, Hearings before
the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 91st Cong., Sess., pt. 1, at 136 (Oct.-Nov., 1969).
41
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only be accomplished by the complete elimination of nuclear power.
Faced with this dilemma, the Commission has made a decision, best
stated in the words of one of the Commissioners testifying before a
committee of Congress in 1969:
Achieving the benefits of nuclear power involves accepting certain
risks. In this respect, nuclear power does not differ from other technological developments like automobiles, airplanes, and medicines,
which have profoundly influenced the quality and character of human
activity.
No matter how we choose to meet our growing energy needs, we
must accept the fact that there will be risks. There is just no way
humanly possible that the risks can be completely eliminated. The real
challenge is to assure that the risks are well enough understood and
kept as small as possible consistent with meeting the energy and other
needs which health and well-being require. In other words, 46some
reasonable balance must be achieved between risks and benefits.
The AEC has thus set up a regulatory program to at least theoretically limit radioactive releases from commercial uses of atomic
energy. The standards have been synthesized from the combined judgment of the Federal Radiation Council, the National Academy of
Sciences, the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurement, the International Commission on Radiological Protection, and
"consultants selected for expertise in the various areas of interest."4
Critics point out that the AEC, however, makes the final decision
and runs its own show. They go so far as to say that in pursuing its
major objective of expanding the peaceful use of the atom, it has tended
to de-emphasize its congressional mandate to look out for public health
and safety. While they do not claim that the AEC intentionally disregards the dangers of radiation, they do point out that it has always
been late to recognize them. An example cited is in the field of
atmospheric testing of nuclear bombs. One critic points out that
typically:
[N]ot all the dangers of setting off even a few nuclear bombs were
fully anticipated by the governments involved in the manufacture of
these weapons. In 1953, spokesmen for the United States Atomic
Energy Commission saw no danger from testing to persons outside the
testing zone. By 1956 .. .the AEC acknowledged a negligible hazard.
One year later, there was official recognition of a small risk. By 1958,
AEC officials were referring to real dangers. In 1959, it was stated that
46

47

Id. at 133-34.
Id. at 134.
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there were specific limits to testing
beyond which nuclear explosions
48
would constitute grave hazards.
Parenthetically, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was not written solely to
limit nuclear armaments and research on them. Both the United States
and the Soviet Union had come to realize the dangers of radioactive
pollution.
Looking at its history with regard to radiation dangers from
nuclear explosions, many critics feel that the AEC is probably at least
twenty years behind general scientific thought in its approach to the
dangers from nuclear reactors. This feeling may well come from the
development of the agency itself. The original Atomic Energy Act
of 1946 was completely silent on questions of reactor safety. It provided for a government monopoly on atomic energy, and all reactors
made for the AEC had large safety factors built into them. Cost was
no object. Further, they were located far from population centers.49
The Act of 1954 authorized private use of the atom, and gave the
AEC not only the task of overseeing this private use but also the task
of regulating it in regard to public safety. Nevertheless, the "act is
virtually devoid of standards for such safety."50 The AEC has set up
such standards by administrative regulation, but critics contend that
these standards are as vague as those of the act. The AEC also reviews
reactor construction and operation in a dual licensing procedure."' In
this regard, the Commission must first approve the construction of every
facility utilizing nuclear energy. Once construction is completed, the
Commission must again review the whole program before granting an
operating license. The construction permit does not require reasonable
assurances that public health and safety will not be endangered by the
operation of the facility. The operating license does require these
reasonable assurances, allowing and in many cases even requiring
installation of safety features not even invented at the time of the
issuance of the construction permit. While many have criticized this
system, it seems safe to assume that no public utility will risk millions
Supra n.14, at 37-38.
Supra n.42, at 119.
Id. at 121.
51 An analysis of the step-by-step procedure for the licensing of a nuclear power plant
by the AEC is set out in Power Reactor Development Co. v. International Union of
Electrical Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 404-09 (1961).
48

49
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of dollars building a power plant which will not be expected to operate
well within the standards of safety set by the AEC.
Initially the entire licensing procedure was conducted in an atmosphere of semi-secrecy, perhaps a holdover from the war-time classification of the Manhattan Project operations. The safety findings of the
AEC were not made public; only "assurances" that the AEC had
determined that operations would be reasonably safe were issued.5
A lawsuit by three labor unions, the first challenge to AEC authority,
changed all of this. While the AEC won its case in the Supreme Court
in 1961," 8 it revised its procedures to provide for some disclosure of
its safety determinations. In fact, as a result of the public clamor,
Congress insisted on public hearings on all licensing applications, and
attempted by legislation to compel the Commission to bring reactor
safety problems into the open. The result was only a partial success."
There is still a large absence of definite standards, attributable
partially to the fact that the industry is still in a developmental stage.
The AEC has worried that premature development of standards might
tend to stifle the growth of civil use of atomic energy. Concerned
individuals, however, have worried that the lack of these standards may
result in the death of the planet. Accordingly, some states have passed
laws attempting to enforce codes of their own which are much more
restrictive than those of the Commission. The Agency has resisted their
imposition on the grounds of federal preemption of the field.
Summarizing, one can but again quote from The Careless Atom:
[RIemarkable is the Atomic Energy Commission, the agency which

has sole responsibility for the development and use of atomic energy.

The AEC is also the agency with sole responsibility for regulation in
this field. In fact, it is responsible for regulating its own activities....

The AEC has broader powers than have ever been given to a
single federal agency. Among other things, the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954 apparently gave the AEC power (according to its contention)
to impose security restrictions on any activities, whether conducted
with or without government support, which bear on atomic energy,
however tangentially....
With sole authority in its area of activity, extremely broad
Supra n.42, at 130.
53 Power Reactor Development Co. v. International Union of Electrical Workers, 367
U.S. 396 (1961). 2
54 Supra n.4 , at 131-32.
52
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powers, and with much of its activity cloaked by security restrictions
on information, the AEC is a singularly difficult body to influence. It
is subject only to the restraints of the Joint Committee, designated
by law its 'watchdog'. Yet over the years the two bodies have drawn
together until they are almost indistinguishable.55
V.

INFLUENCING THE AEC

The problems encountered by attorneys and local citizen groups in
the area of environmental law are perhaps illustrated in their most
extreme form when the AEC is involved. The law in the field is at best
unfamiliar and technical, at worst, non-existent.50 When the AEC enters
the picture, one encounters administrative law practiced by an allpowerful government agency in its most demanding aspects. Nonetheless, according to one writer, "the problem . . . of the restoration and
maintenance of a liveable environment is, to a large extent, the problem
of the control of administrative agencies by the courts."5' 7
Environmentalist groups seeking to alter a ruling, in addition
to the expected problem of proving their case, meet other handicaps
when coming up against an administrative agency. Not only is the group
normally without funds, while the government has unlimited monetary
and legal resources, but the group will usually turn to the courts late,
as a last resort, after public opinion and other political efforts have
failed. Discovery, especially difficult with the AEC, must be abridged
because of the time consideration. The record is voluminous and scattered. The witnesses who are conversant with the details (the industry
and governmental employees involved) are hostile. And the first hurdle
to face is the issue of standing,5 which really has no bearing on the
ultimate merits. 59
The monolithic Atomic Energy Commission, however, can be
moved, even though it has apparently won all of its controversies except
the recent conflict with the Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee. °
(After an adverse ruling in Maun v. United States,6 Congress amended
55 S. Novick, The Careless Atom 193-94 (1969).
56 Plaintiff's Brief on the Project Rulison Case, 55 Cornell L. Rev. 761, (1970).
57 Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 612, 614-15 (1970).
58 Id. at 618.
59 Supra n.56, at 761-62.
00 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n., 449 F.2d 1109
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
61 347 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1965).
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the Atomic Energy Act "to make clear that no federal, state, or local
62
agency had any power of control over activities of the Commission.")
Four key decisions involving the AEC are discussed in this section.
They were all first of their kind: (1) the first contested licensing pro.
cedure; 3 (2) the first questioning of radiation standards;64 (3) the
first federal case to dispute the AEC's right to preemption in the setting
of radiation standards ;" (4) the first interpretation, relative to the AEC,
of the environmental control acts. 6 A fifth case, settled out of court,
demonstrates what appears to be one of the most effective methods by
which environmentalist groups can force more rigid safety standards
than those of the AEC on nuclear-power companies."e
A.

Power Reactor Development Comany

The first case to question the wisdom and ability of the AEC (a
suit brought by three labor unions against the United States) 68 reached
the Supreme Court. 9 This case brought into the open the Commission's
semi-secret consideration of public safety matters and its methods of
issuing construction permits and operating licenses. True to its statutory
charter, the Commission had issued a provisional permit for the construction of a nuclear plant to produce electricity to the Power Reactor
Development Company (PRDC). It had determined that "substantial
experimental and theoretical work remained to be performed before it
could conclude that a reactor of the type proposed could be safely
operated at the proposed site." 7 The Commission had failed to find
that there were reasonable assurances that such a reactor could be
operated without danger to the public. It had withheld determination
of approval of operation pending a later licensing procedure.
62

New Hampshire v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1969).

Power Reactor Development Co., v. International Union of Electrical Workers, 367
U.S. 396 (1961).
64 Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970).
65 Northern States Power Co. v. State of Minn., 320 F. Supp. 172 (D. Minn. 1970);
447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971).
66 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n., 449 F.2d
1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
67 Thermal Ecology Must Be Preserved v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 70 C 2049 (N.D.
63

Ill. E.D. 1970).
68 International Union of Electrical Workers v. U.S., 280 F.2d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
69 Power Reactor Development Co. v. International Union of Electrical Workers, 367
U.S. 396 (1961).
70 Supra n.42, at 130-31.
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Issuance of the construction permit led to considerable public
debate and to the formal intervention in the proceedings by the labor
unions "who contended primarily that the construction permit was
issued contrary to statute and to the AEC's own regulations."7 1 When
the case came to court, standing was relegated to a relatively minor
position, perhaps because the AEC had not yet found it to be a most
convenient method for disposition of irritating litigation. The court
simply found the construction permit to be a final order and the
plaintiffs to be aggrieved because "the fear of possible atomic catastrophe, in itself, before any operation would begin, would, among other
things have the effect of depressing values of property owned by the
Petitioners."7 2
Surprisingly, at least for the AEC, the court of appeals held for
the unions. The court not only decided against the Commission on the
basis of the Atomic Energy Act, but also held that the Commission
might not authorize construction of a reactor near a large population
center without "compelling reasons" for doing so." A dissent by Judge
(later Chief Justice) Burger argued, however, that "in an area involving as much scientific uncertainty as development of nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes, the Commission must be permitted to proceed
step by step."74
Speaking for the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Brennan pointed out
that this was the first contested licensing proceeding to be decided by
the AEC. The Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, stating
that responsibility for safeguarding health and safety belongs to the
Commission under the Atomic Energy Act. Justice Brennan noted that
the Act "clearly contemplates that the Commission shall by regulation
set forth what the public safety requires as a prerequisite to the issuance
of any license or permit under the Act." 75 He further stated that the
holding of the court of appeals regarding the requirement of "compelling reasons" for locating a nuclear plant near a large city was
71
72
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International Union of Electrical Workers v. U.S., 280 F.2d 645, 647 (D.C. Cir.

73 Power Reactor Development Co. v. International Union of Electrical Workers, 367
U.S. 396 (1961).
74 International Union of Electrical Workers v. U.S., 280 F.2d 645, 652 (D.C. Cir.
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without merit as neither the statute nor the AEC regulations mentioned
these words.7" In summing up, he said:
We hold that the actions of the Commission up to now have been
within the Congressional authorization. We cannot assume that the
Commission will exceed its powers, or that these many
77 safeguards to
protect the public interest will not be fully effective.
Although the Commission won its case in the Supreme Court, public
pressure and Congress forced it to alter its position so as to begin providing some limited disclosure of its safety determinatons. s
B.

Project Rulison

1 960's,

During the
the AEC turned its attention to Program Plowshare, a program designed to develop peaceful use of nuclear explosive
technology.7" The AEC had been forced to stand trial for the first time
on its licensing procedures in the PRDC case ;so in litigation over Project
Rulison, a part of the Plowshare Program, it was forced to stand trial
for the first time on the issue of radiation safety standards, a matter the
Commission had totally preempted.8 '
Project Rulison was a joint experiment of the AEC, the Department
of the Interior, and a private company to study the economic and
technical feasibility of obtaining natural gas from low permeability
sandstone in the Rulison Field of Colorado by "nuclear stimulation."
"Nuclear stimulation" is bureaucratese for the explosion of an atomic
device in the depths of the earth to create a cavity and fracture system
allowing for the collection of natural gas. The economic potential of
such an operation is great because of the many large natural gas
reserves of the Rulison type. 2
The American Civil Liberties Union brought the first action to
enjoin Project Rulison. It was dismissed out of court."s Three other
actions, later consolidated, were then brought by the Colorado Open
Spaces Coordination Council (COSCC), a local environmentalist group;
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by Messrs. Smith, Crowther, and Eames, property owners near the explosion site; and by Mr. Martin DuMont, the local district attorney.
When the court refused to enjoin the explosion, the litigants moved to
prohibit the planned flaring of the gas collected in the underground
cavity. 4
This time, in a change of tactics from the PRDC case, the Commission went all out to have the suit dismissed on the issues of standing
and justiciability. Crowther v. Seaborg5 is necessary reading for
anyone faced with these problems. Suffice it to say that after a lengthy
analysis, both COSCC and the landowners were held to have sufficient
property interests to bring suit. The case brought by the district attorney
was dismissed. Administrative law was reviewed extensively, and it was
held that Dr. Seaborg could be sued either in his individual capacity
for improper performance of his duties as head of the AEC, or as head
of the AEC, and that the AEC and the United States could also be sued
because of the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act as applied to the Atomic Energy Act. The court further stated that it would
have considered an equitable nuisance suit had the other issues not been
presented."6
Once the problems of law were decided, the court proceeded to
the merits of the case, and entered into a lengthy evaluation of the
issues. Finally, after admitting that it was in no position "to evaluate
a scientific controversy of great sophistication,""7 the court held for the
Commission, saying:
We conclude that the evidence shows that the AEC is following
the Congressional mandate and its own rules and regulations, and
that the actions and plans of the AEC in the prosecution of ...Proj ect Rulison constitute a reasonable exercise of its statutory authority
to conduct research in the utilization of atomic energy while providing
for the protection of the health and safety of the public.es

The court went out of its way to say that it considered the extent
and nature of governmental participation in the development of energy
sources to be a political question, one to be decided by Congress and
not by the courts. The proper function of the courts, it said, is solely
84
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to determine whether the Commission has exceeded the congressional
standards established to protect the public.8 9 As stated earlier, these
standards are both technical and vague.
The editors of the Cornell Law Review point out that although the
Project Rulison case was by no means an unmitigated victory for the
plaintiffs, it was still an outstanding success. They have reprinted
the COSCC brief in its entirety to demonstrate the "threshold issues encountered in environmental law practice." 9
C.

Northern States and Dresden

The brewing controversy between the AEC and the separate states
concerning the setting of radiation-emission standards came to a boil
in 1969. The 1959 amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
removed any reference to federal preemption in the setting of standards.
Though emissions might not exceed federally set levels, it appeared
that the states now had full authority to impose their own more stringent
restrictions on radioactive pollution. Accordingly, the state of Minnesota set up a Pollution Control Agency (PCA), which drew up such
a code.
The issue was joined when a public utility, Northern States Power
Company, received a construction permit from the AEC and built a
nuclear generating plant on the Mississippi River at Monticello, Minnesota. Allowing what they considered to be a wide margin of safety, the
engineers designed the plant to discharge waste with only about one
percent of the AEC-allowable radiation content. They considered that
at times of exceptionally low river flow the radioactivity level might
increase to ten percent of the standard. This level, however, would approach or exceed the PCA limits. Further, the PCA required analysis of
the exact composition of the radioactive discharge where the Commission treated all isotopes together."'
The PCA issued its permit to Northern States to operate the
reactor, but attached conditions to the waste discharge which the company felt to be impossible of fulfillment, at least for the foreseeable
89 Id. at 1231.
90 Supra n.56.

91 Bryerton, Critics Scared But the Voices Are Getting Louder, Eugene
Register Guard, Oct. 8, 1969, at 3A.
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future. These conditions would have required new equipment designed
specifically for the Monticello plant at what was considered to be a
prohibitive expense. The Company thus went to court, alleging that
Minnesota was without authority to regulate the discharge of radioactive
waste because the field had been preempted by the federal government.
The PCA, meanwhile, threatened criminal sanctions if the company did
not comply with its regulations.
The attorneys general for the states of Maryland, Michigan,
Missouri, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia and Wisconsin, as well as
attorneys for some of the members of the Southern Governors' Conference, filed briefs in the suit as amici curiae.92 Oregon, and 18 other
states which had signed agreements with the AEC, apparently excluding
radioactivity from nuclear reactors from their jurisdiction, became
vitally interested.9 3
The district court almost ignored the issue of standing. It handled
the matter most expeditiously, merely stating: "Jurisdiction is established. . . . There is a justiciable controversy. Employment of the
Declaratory Judgments Law is appropriate." 94 It thus came immediately
to the matter of preemption.
Where the case of Crowther v. Seaborg95 presented an excellent
discussion of the subjects of standing and justiciability, this case,
Northern States Power Company v. The State of Minnesota,6 presents
an excellent analysis of the subject of federal preemption. As might
have been expected, however, the court held that the federal government
had preempted the field of standard setting regarding allowable radioactive emissions. While it stated that the efforts of the PCA and the
state of Minnesota were commentable, it pointed out that it was up to
the AEC to raise its standards if they were inadequate, or for Congress
to specifically authorize the states to do the same. 7
The issue was raised again almost immediately in Illinois when
92

Northern States Power Co. v. State of Minn., 320 F. Supp. 172 (D. Minn. 1970).

93

Supra n.91.
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the Commonwealth Edison Company filed an application before the
newly created Pollution Control Board (PCB) for the issuance of a
permit for its Dresden Unit 3. The hearing officer asked Commonwealth Edison to prove the following:
(1) How does a boiling water reactor operate?
(2) What are the sources of pollutants, including but not limited
to radioactive, solid waste and heated water, proposed to be emitted
from Dresden Unit 3?
(3) What controls does Commonwealth Edison propose on the
sources of pollutants?
(4) Are the controls proposed by Commonwealth Edison the best
available within today's technology? If not, what are the best methods
and what do they cost?
(5) As to radioactivity, what are the levels at which humans or
animals are affected? Are these levels reached at any time by the
operation of the plant... ?98
Relying on the Northern States case, Commonwealth Edison challenged the authority of the PCB operating under the Illinois Environmental Protection Act.99 The ruling of the PCB, published as In Re
Dresden Nuclear Power Station,'° admitted that the Minnesota district
court had held that the AEC's authority to regulate radioactive releases
was exclusive. 1 ' It went on to state, however, that the PCB had to disagree with the conclusion reached in that case since it could find nothing
in the law to prohibit the federal and state governments from jointly
exercising authority in a field. 10 2 It stated that the issue was whether or
not the limitations imposed by the Board in any way conflicted with
the purposes of the federal statute, and held that they did not, pointing
out that "there is no particular reason why the emissions from nuclear
plants in Vermont should be the same as those in New Mexico."' 3
According to the PCB:
[T]he case for depriving states of authority in the interest of uniform
regulation has no place in the case of stationary nuclear reactors.
98 In Re Dresden Nuclear Power Station, 2 E.R.C. 1302, 1304 (Ill.
Pollution Control
Bd. 1971).
9 Ill.
Rev. Stat. ch. 111Y, § 1001 et seq.
100 2 E.R.C. 1302 (il. Pollution Control Bd. 1971).
lo Interestingly, the intervenor at the hearing was the Environmental Law Society
of the University of Chicago Law School.
102 In Re Dresden Nuclear Power Station, 2 E.R.C. 1302, 1304 (Ill.
Pollution Control
Bd. 1971).
1o Id. at 1306.
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The contention has . . . been made that state regulation might in
some way interfere with the congressional policy favoring the promotion of nuclear power. And so it could, if a state were to attempt to
outlaw the production of nuclear power altogether, or to impose
conditions that unreasonably burdened the production of nuclear
power. But the limitations we impose today have no such effect. All we
require is what the AEC has declared is its own policy, namely, that
radioactive releases be kept as low as is practicable. The restrictions
we impose are based entirely upon the applicant's own testimony as to
what is technically and economically feasible,...
In sum, we believe that Congress has not preempted our authority
to take the action we take today. We cannot afford, when the health
and safety of Illinois citizens are at stake, to take the easy road and
pass the task of adequate regulation on to Big Brother. 10 4
Four months after this ruling of the Illinois PCB, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the lower court
judgment in Northern States.' Illinois submitted an amicus curiae
brief in support of Minnesota at that appeal.'
On April 3, 1972, the
Supreme Court affirmed the Northern States decision. "6
D.

Palisades

In ruling for the Commission in The State of New Hampshire v.
The Atomic Energy Commission107 in January, 1969, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals was forced to admit that:
We confront a serious gap between the dangers of modern technology
and the protections afforded by law as the Commission interprets
8
it.10

This was a thermal rather than a radioactive pollution case, but to
the environmentalist the basic problems are the same, the destruction
of the ecosphere. All of the legal issues previously discussed were
present in the case, with the same predictable outcome.
In holding for the Colorado Public Utilities Commission, and thus
de facto for the AEC, in United Mine Workers v. Public Utilities Commission of Colorado,"9 the Colorado Supreme Court apparently missed
the point made by the First Circuit Court. A comment was made to the
104
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105 Northern States Power Co. v. State of Minn., 447 F.2d 1143
106 Id. at 1145 n.1.
106a Chi. Trib., Apr. 4, 1972, at 2, col. 7.

(8th Cir. 1971).

406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1969).
New Hampshire v. Atomic Energy Comm'n., 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1969).
109 - Colo. -, - P.2d -, IERl115 (1970).
107
108

THE ENVIRONMENTALIST

AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE

ffect that "it is not enough to oppose responsible and competent engileering design with vague objections, conjecture and speculation.""'
Despite such decisions, however, headway has been made against
irbitrary AEC action. According to a 1969 article appearing in the
Eugene (Oregon) Register Guard, plans for the construction of nuclear
-lectric plants have been abandoned or delayed at Bodega Bay, Califorlia, Queens and Cayuga Falls, New York, and Calvert Cliffs, Mary[and. The Bodega Bay plant was to have been built directly over the
3an Andreas Fault."'
In 1970 several environmental protection groups assailed the
Commission's right to issue an operating license for the Palisades Plant
:f the Consumers Power Company at South Haven, Michigan. The
groups first attempted to obtain a temporary stay of the licensing
procedure itself," 2 and later moved in a district court in Chicago for
an injunction to bar hearings at the procedure on the basis that they
were in violation of the Atomic Energy Act," 3 the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,1" and the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act" 5 as amended by the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970.1
Plaintiffs claimed that the AEC was not providing valid radiation stanlards to protect the health and safety of the public and was thus acting
illegally in holding any hearings at all. Plaintiffs contended that the
Commission had failed to consider the cumulative effects of radiation
pollution, instead considering each reactor on an ad hoc basis." 7 They
pointed out that the AEC had not changed its radiation standards
in nearly ten years."' In addition, they raised the issue of thermal
pollution, which the Commission had avoided in the past by claiming
it to be outside the scope of the Atomic Energy Act." 9
This time the environmentalists won their battle but not by means
110 Id. at 1117.
111 Supra n.91.
112 Thermal Ecology Must Be Preserved v. Atomic Energy Comm'n., 433 F.2d 524
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
113 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq.
114 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.
115 33 U.S.C. § 466 et seq.
116 PL 91-224, 33 U.S.C. 1171.
117 Motion for Injunctive Relief, Thermal Ecology Must Be Preserved v. Atomic
Energy Comm'n., 70 C 2049 (N.D. Ill. E.D. 1970).
118 Undated press release from Sierra Club Foundation, Grand Rapids, Mich.
119 C1. New Hampshire v. Atomic Energy Comm'n., 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1969).
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of a court decision, which, if past history proves anything, might wel.
have gone against them. By applying the economic pressure of a con
tinual shut-down during extended litigation against a generating plan
ready to go on stream, the plaintiffs cost the power company approxi
mately $1 million per month, commencing in May, 1969. Thus or
March 16, 1971, the company, though not the AEC, agreed to meet th(
plaintiffs' demands to install some $15 million in additional safet 3
equipment. This equipment should reduce radioactive liquid discharg(
into Lake Michigan to practically a zero level, and should greatly limil
the thermal gradient originally planned. The company, in addition
agreed to install gaseous radioactive-waste controls when perfected. 2 '
E.

Calvert Cliffs

As has been noted, the AEC has consistently refused to considei
restrictions applied by state regulatory bodies and environmental factor,
not mentioned in the Atomic Energy Act. In 1969, it was upheld in thi,
view regarding thermal pollution because the Act made it responsibli
only for radioactive emissions. 121 In 1972, the AEC was sustained in it,
position regarding federal preemption of the field of radiation stan.
dards.122 Congress and many of the state legislatures, however, have
recently passed environmental control acts with much broader views.
In direct confrontation with the viewpoint of the AEC is that of thE
Pollution Control Board of the state of Illinois. The Board is noi
satisfied with meeting minimal federal standards but expects radio.
active emissions to be reduced to as low a level as is practicable. 12 When
it looks at the environmental effects of a nuclear facility, the Board
considers not only the radioactive hazards of construction and opera.
tion but also all of the other possible pollution problems, such as water
and solid waste. 24
Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
in 1969.121 In 1971, in a far reaching decision involving the AEC, this
120 Nuclear Power Plant Agrees to Install Antipollution Curbs, Chicago Tribune, Mar,
17, 1971, § 2 at 13.
121 New Hampshire v. Atomic Energy Comm'n., 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1969).
122 Supra n.106a.
123 In Re Dresden Nuclear Power Station, 2 E.R.C. 1302, 1310 (Ill. Pollution Control
Bd. 1971).
124 Id. at 1307.
125 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.
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.ct was construed to make "environmental protection a part of the
nandate of every federal agency and department.""' 6 Petitioners were
.n environmentalist group known as the Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
iommittee. They attacked not only the Commission's rules governing
he Calvert Cliffs nuclear plant 2 7 but also the Commission's general
ules, arguing that they failed to satisfy the rigorous demands of
EPA.
The court analyzed NEPA, the Water Quality Improvement Act
if 1970,129 and the AEC's policies with respect to these acts. It pointed
out that NEPA compels consideration of any and all types of environnental impact by federal action,"' requiring "that an agency musto the fullest extent possible under its other statutory obligations--conider alternatives to its actions which would reduce environmental
lamage.""' It stated that despite these new laws, the AEC continued
o specifically exclude a wide variety of environmental issues from full
:onsideration.
The court recognized that while Congress was cognizant of the
,ctions of federal, state and local agencies in developing and enforcing
nvironmental standards, it did not authorize a total abdication to those
,gencies. It did, however, provide for full consultation." 2 Thus it held
hat "the Commission must revise its rules governing consideration of
,nvironmental issues.'
Since this case did not deal specifically with radiation problems,
he majority in the Northern States appeal, rendering their decision
tbout six weeks later, apparently ignored its impact. The dissenting
udge, however, stated that since the passage of the Atomic Energy Act,
,ongress has manifested a clear interest in protecting the natural
-nvironments and in furtherance thereof has enacted the environmental
ontrol acts.
126 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n., 449 F.2d 1109,
L112 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
127
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A good discussion of these acts is found in Calvert Cliffs'....
The environmental control acts recognize a significant state interest in
protecting environment. Calvert Cliffs' points out that AEC rules
adopted subsequent to NEPA require that a condition be added to all
nuclear construction permits which would obligate the holders of the
permits to observe all4 applicable environmental standards imposed by
federal or state law.13
According to Dr. J. R. Schlesinger, its new chairman, the AEC has
accepted the Calvert Cliffs' decision, and actually issued new and
stricter environmental regulations for nuclear power plants in Septem.
ber, 1971. Thus the issues of radioactive discharge and thermal pollu.
tion have finally been joined.'3 5
VI.

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, nuclear energy is dangerous. The effects of
synthetic radioisotopes are different from those of their naturally oc.
curring cousins because the former are absorbed into the ecological
food chain. To just what extent they are different, either qualitatively
or quantitatively, we do not yet know.
It is apparent that absolutely safe levels of radioactivity cannol
be asserted. Yet man is now unalterably committed, for better or for
worse, to live with nuclear energy. When these two facts are accepted,
the problem is somewhat clarified. Society must perform a balancing
test; it must determine what risks are acceptable for the results desired.
Dr. Glen Seaborg, former AEC chairman, recognized the value
judgments involved in a speech delivered at the Argonne National
Laboratory in 1969:
As Dr. Abel Wolman, one of America's leading authorities on
sanitary engineering, has often asked in hearings or interviews on our
environmental problems, 'How clean do we want our waterways? Clean
enough to drink from? To swim in? To sustain their fish and wildlife?'
These are choices, Dr. Wolman cogently points out, that involve
various degrees of effort-in applying known technologies and in
carrying out new research and development, in resource expenditure,
and in setting goals and establishing priorities. They involve far more
than simply the demands of one particular vocal interest group. More
often the question is not just 'How clean do we want our air and
water?' but 'What are we willing to pay for what kind of air and
water?' And this payment may be other than merely money; it may
134 Northern States Power Co. v. State of Minn., 447 F.2d 1143, 1157 (8th Cir. 1971).
135
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involve many radical changes in our lives, including some control of
what we purchase, the way we produce it, how we use it, where we use
it, and how we dispose of it or recycle it.136

From the point of view of the environmentalist, and many scientists, the standards of the AEC have been overly lax. In addition to
minimizing the dangers of accumulated radioactive poisoning, they
have completely ignored the hazards of sabotage and enemy action.' 3 7
The arguments and actual litigation of the conservationists,
lawyers, scientists and engineers, appear, however, to be forcing the
AEC to tighten its standards and to re-analyze its safety decisions. If
these groups continue to be the watchdogs they have already become,
the fight over whether the AEC preempts the field of nuclear emission
standards, for instance, may well become moot. It is irrelevant whether
the pressure comes economically, as in the Palisades case, or by passage
and later interpretation of environmental control acts as in Calvert
Cliffs'. The results will the same: a safer world in which to live while
obtaining the benefits of nuclear technology.
In his speech on pollution control, delivered February 8, 1971,
President Nixon proposed a power-plant-siting law which would provide
for one agency in each state to have responsibility for all environmental
effects of such installations. He suggested a ten-year period from
planning to the beginning of construction of such plants, certainly sufficient to allow all interested groups to be heard and to take all scientific
and lay opinions into consideration. He pointed out that public hearings
would be required.'
Dr. Edward Teller, often called the "father of the H-bomb," 13' 9
went the President one better when he came out for underground reactors. He pointed out that we not only know how to contain pollution
in such installations, but that the Swedes are already building them. In
a lengthy speech to a group of petroleum engineers, he capably demolished any desire for such things as nuclear-powered automobiles
136 Seaborg, Remarks at a meeting of the National Academy of Sciences, National
Research Council Solid State Science Panel, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.,
May 5, 1969, Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, Congress of the U.S., Selected Material on
Environmental Effects of Producing Electric Power 450 (Aug. 1969).
137 Ackerman, Atomic Power-Who Looks After Public Safety? IEEE Transactions on
Aerospace & Electronic Systems 369 (May 1969).
188 The official text of President Nixon's proposal to Congress, U.S. News & World
Report 72 (Feb. 22, 1971).
189 Supra n.27, at 38.
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80

or aircraft. Such inventions, while perhaps utilitarian, would be just
too potentially hazardous for consideration. 4 '
Neither the President, the Congress, the scientists or the people
appear to be sufficiently worried about the atomic graveyards. An explosion in any one of them could easily result in the nuclear contamination
of a large part of the United States. Built over aquifers, near major
rivers, in the desert, or even in salt mines, they are potentially the most
dangerous regions on earth. Are they as safe as the AEC contends? They
can't be! If they were, no one would have suggested the futuristic concept of moving them to the sun.
140
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